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failed to obtain by compelling the defendants either to file suit on the al-
leged mechanics' lien or, after the sixty days' notice had passed, be barred
from ever asserting the same."-
It is unfortunate that the two dissenting judges in the Gustafson case
did not feel inclined to express their views in a written opinion. It would
have been interesting to see on what grounds they differed with the logical
opinion expressed by the majority.
RIcHARD E. GUSTER
LABOR LAW - SECTION 301(a) LMRA NOT APPLICABLE TO
CONTRACTS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE
The plaintiff labor organization sought a declaratory judgment as to the
rights of the parties under a collective bargaining agreement, together with
an accounting to determine the amounts of employees' salaries wrongfully
withheld and a judgment in favor of the individual employees found to be
entitled thereto. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,1 held that the subject matter of plaintiff's
complaint was not within the grant of federal-question jurisdiction found
in Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act? and dismissed
the complaint on the ground of lack of diversity of citizenship.3
Section 301 (a) applies only where the contract violated was between
an employer and a labor organization.4 The issue presented is whether the
right asserted in the instant case arises from a violation of the collective
bargaining contract between the union and the employer or from separate
contracts between the employer and the individual employees. If the latter
is true there is no diversity jurisdiction in the case at bar, and no jurisdiction
to entertain this suit. Plaintiff admits that the rights in dispute are the
clains of individual employees for their salaries, but contends that these
individual employees whom it represents are third party beneficiaries of the
collective bargaining contract. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the individual
employees' rights arise out of that agreement, and the present claims would
be based upon a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor or-
gamzation. Plaintiff cites I. L Case Co. v,. NLRB among others6 in support
of the third party beneficiary theory.
The court refused to accept the third party beneficiary theory because
there are some provisions of the collective bargaining contract which run
only to the benefit of the umon and could not run to the benefit of the indi-
vidual employee.7 Also, the consideration for the employer's promise to pay
"OIo REv. CODE § 1311.11.
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wages is given by the beneficiary, rather than by the union. Furthermore,
that theory leaves the employer without recourse against the employee, since
the latter, the beneficiary, had made no promises. The court in the instant
case interprets the J. L Case case as meaning
That the individual employee is a third party beneficiary of the collec-
tive bargaining contract only in the sense that the collective force of all
employees in the unit has been brought to bear upon the employer to
hammer out a bargain with him, the terms of which, by virtue of the
statutory mandate, must be included in the employee's contract of hire, but
that the provision of the collective contract specifying rates of pay ripens
into a legal right only under the individual contract of hire and only be-
cause of the individual employee's labor8
After discussing other conflicting theories found in cases explaining the
tripartite relations raised by a collective bargaining contract,' the court
formulates its own eclectic theory.
1 Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 107
F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Pa. 1952). The defendant presented three grounds for its
motion to dismiss: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; wrong party plantiff;
and failure of complaint to state a cause of action. The court ruled against the first
two contentions and in favor of the last.
'61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "(a) Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties."
'Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210
F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1954).
'Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1950);
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrlCE § 17.25 (2nd ed. 1948).
'321 U.S. 332, 64 Sup. Ct. 576 (1944).
'Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers International Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th
Cit. 1951); American Federation of Labor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 179
F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950); Bakery & Confectionery Workers' International Union
v. National Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684 (3rd Cir. 1949).
Check-off provisions are an outstanding example.
'210 F.2d 623, 627 (1954).
'a) The view that a collective bargaining contract was binding only, in morals was
once accepted. Its underlying philosophy was that the law should not meddle with
such agreements. Teller, LABOR DIsPuTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 157
(1940).
b) A second theory is that the collective agreement establishes a usage in the
plant or industry and that the individual contracts of hire are made with that usage in
mind. This theory gives little legal significance to the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The rights and duties arise from the individual hiring contract. Ibid § 159.
c) The third theory is that, in contracting with the employer, the union acts as
agent for those it represents. This theory encounters the difficulty of explaining how
an employee may become a party to the agreement, where he joins the union subse-
quent to the negotiations thereof. Ibid § 167.
d) Another theory finds that the union in contracting with the employer does so
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The court reasons that the collective contract between the union and the
employer is not a contract of hire. No employee gets a job by reason of the
collective agreement and no obligation to any individual arises from it.'10
The collective agreement between the union and the employer establishes
the wages, hours, and conditions which the employer includes in the contract
of hire with the individual employees of the bargaining unit because of the
National Labor Relations Act. An analogy is drawn to tariffs established
by a carrier or a utility rate schedule. The rights and duties involved do
not arise of themselves from the tariffs or schedules, but arise only when
contracts are entered into between carrier and shipper and utility and cus-
tomer. While the employer's general duty to pay a certain rate arises out of
the collective bargaining contract plus the mandates of the National Labor
Relations Act, the special duty to pay a particular employee wages arises out
of the contract of hire. Since the duty to pay wages to a particular employee
is the one alleged in the instant case and since this duty is not a violation of a
contract between a labor union and an employer, Section 301 (a) 1 cannot
be used as a basis for federal jurisdiction.
After formulating this theory the court presents the problems which
would result should the plaintiff's contentions be accepted. The court points
out that the rights asserted in the case at bar are the individual rights of
about four thousand employees, none of whom is joined or named. Under
such circumstances the doctrine of res judicata would be an obstade.12 An-
other problem is presented by the numerous cases which hold that the union
is the only proper party to any suit under Section 301 (a).13 Under that doc-
trine the union would be the exclusive agent to negotiate rights of all those
whom it represents under the National Labor Relations Act, whether mem-
bers of the union or not. This, together with a holding by the Supreme Court
of New York'" that Congress intended that the federal courts should be the
exclusive fora to determine cases involving collective bargaining contracts
under Section 301 (a), would put the individual employee out of court.
Therefore, the individual employee would have a right to his salary but no
remedy to enforce it.
for the benefit of those whom it represents. The employees are third party bene-
ficiaries to the collective agreement. Ibid § 168.
0 J.1. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 335, 64 Sup. Ct. 576, 579 (1944).
U 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
"If plaintiff should prevail on the merits what of an employee in the unit who may
have been inadvertently omitted from the reckoning? Is he barred? Is the de-
fendant safe in paying the judgment in favor of plaintiff? If plaintiff should lose
on the merits, as it did in the district court, are all employees in the unit barred?"
210 F.2d 623, 629.
" United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952); Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.
Ark. 1953); Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
"Fitzgerald v. Kictograph Products, Inc., 28 L.R.R.M. 2611 (1951).
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